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Abstract Aim of this work is to provide a formal characterization of those emotions that
deal with normative reasoning, such as shame and sense of guilt, to understand their relation
with rational action and to ground their formalization on a cognitive science perspective. In
order to do this we need to identify the factors that constitute the preconditions and trigger the
reactions of shame and sense of guilt in cognitive agents, that is when agents feel ashamed or
guilty and what agents do when they feel so. We will also investigate how agents can induce
and silence these feelings in themselves, i.e. the analysis of defensive strategies they can
employ. We will argue that agents do have control over their emotions and we will analyze
some operations they can carry out on them.
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“You know, everybody makes mistakes when they are president”
(William Jefferson Clinton)
1 Introduction
In January 1998, the President of US pronounces one of his most famous statements:
I did not have sexual relations with that woman, Miss Lewinsky. I never told anybody
to lie, not a single time - never. These allegations are false. And I need to go back to
work for the American people.
In August 1998, after evidence about the Monica Lewinsky sex scandal is released, he
amends it:
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I did have a relationship with Ms Lewinsky that was not appropriate. In fact, it was
wrong. It constituted a critical lapse in judgment and a personal failure on my part for
which I am solely and completely responsible.
(Source: [9])
If we ask ourselves why his first reaction was to deny he did something wrong, we could
agree with his explanation: “a desire to protect myself from the embarrassment of my own
conduct.” But why did the president of US allow the American media reporting details of his
private life while in a first moment he said that “he will refuse to answer detailed questions
because of privacy considerations affecting his family and in an effort to preserve the dignity
of his office” [5]? It seems that in the struggle between the right to have a private life and
right for the Public Opinion to know, Clinton chose eventually the latter, exposing him to
what media called his “days of shame” [9,5].
Aim of this work is to provide a formal characterization of those emotions that deal with
normative reasoning, such as shame and sense of guilt, to understand their relation with
rational action and to ground their formalization on a cognitive science perspective. In order
to do this we need to identify the factors that constitute the preconditions and trigger the
reactions of shame and sense of guilt in cognitive agents, that is when agents feel ashamed or
guilty and what agents do when they feel so. We will also investigate how agents can induce
and silence these feelings in themselves, i.e. the analysis of defensive strategies they can
employ. We will argue that agents do have control over their emotions and we will analyze
some operations they can carry out on them. We will maintain moral judgment to be socially
determined (by the so called Significant Others [31]) and we will see that many are the ways
of manipulating one’s own emotions depending on one’s psychological inclination. Coming
back to our example, we will see what type of agent the president of the US has been and
what else he could have done in order not to feel embarrassed or responsible.
1.1 Related work
As witnessed by [14] the study of emotions has recently gained much attention in the fields
of Artificial Intelligence [29,19], Evolutionary Computation [30] and Multi Agent Systems
[26], due to the encounter between computer science tools and neuro, cognitive and social
sciences analyses [11,24,23]. Ours is a cognitive perspective: even though we agree that it is
important to study emotions from a computational and emergentist point of view, we argue
that in order to build an anatomy of emotions ([7]) it is as important to understand them in
terms of their interaction with other cognitive ingredients.1
The most influential cognitive paradigm for studying and constructing cognitive agents
with emotions has been that by Ortony, Clore and Collins [24]. Nevertheless, in [24] the
characterizations of feelings related to norms are not deeply investigated:
1 Many criticisms have been moved to cognitivists theories, some of which can be hardly addressed in this
context. Nevertheless we would like to point out how several ones are based on what we think is a miscon-
ception of the use of formal models of cognition. In the study of normative emotions of [30] it is argued
that “logic does not provide an adequate foundation” to the study of human behaviour and “the necessary
abandonment of logical models for the explanation and simulation of human social behaviour” is advocated.
Even though we share the worries in [30] with respect to representing humans as perfect reasoners, we claim
that an anti-logical position in modelling interaction is simply wrong: emotions can be studied as mechanisms
that act on human cognition. But mechanisms do have a logic. What is more, the recent breakthroughs of
logical models in the study of social interaction and information flow [34] have shown that formal semantics
can lead to the construction of rigorous models of complex phenomena such as emotions (as in [19]).
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“In order to feel shame one must have violated a standard one takes to be impor-
tant, as moral standards are. Such violations are held to be inexcusable. This is not
necessary for a person who is feeling guilty.(...) In fact, we do not think that there
is a distinct emotion of feeling guilty. Rather, we view feelings of guilt as mix-
tures of distinct emotions such as shame and regret, perhaps accompanied by certain
cognitive states, such as the belief that one was, at least technically, responsible.”
(p. 142–143)
Many expressions here would need to be explicated further: why are violations only in
case of shame held to be inexcusable? What is a mixture of emotions? And a technical
responsibility? If we find the distinction between shame and sense of guilt and all the other
related feelings as meaningful at all, we need to have clear-cut definitions that relate those
feelings to agents’ mental states and to precisely understand their functioning.
We will pursue a formal investigation on emotions, as done for instance in [26], but
adding a closer look to the formal properties of our notions, that we construct within a
well known logical framework such as KARO [36,37,19]. This means that unlike [26] we
will provide a formal semantics to our language, that will allow to derive logical prop-
erties. Formal models of emotional agents are used in field related to Multi Agent Sys-
tems, such as Game Theory [4]. But logical agents are not only abstract entities. The idea
of implementing them is well rooted in computer science and it dates back to Shoham’s
AGENT-0 [28]. A cognitive formal approach in programming agents with emotions is also
adopted by [12], in which a logic-based agent-oriented programming language is devised,
which is inspired by 3APL [13], and that can be used to implement emotional agents.
We share with [12] the logical framework on which we ground the construction of emo-
tional states. Nevertheless we will not focus on the properties of the agents programs, but
on the dynamics of emotional agents. From a cognitive point of view we will follow the
analysis of [22] that grounds emotional displays like blushing and feelings like loneliness
or pride on complex Multi Agent interaction. We claim that such model overcomes the
oversimplifications in [24] and it is grounded on clear intuitions that ease a proper formal
investigation.
Structure of the paper The paper is structured as follows: We will first present a cogni-
tive model of shame and sense of guilt as social emotions, isolating the preconditions and
the reactions that accompany them. We will then provide a formal representation of shame,
sense of guilt and their dynamics in terms of basic notions such as beliefs, goals and viola-
tions, following the rational action approach of [36,37,19,32]. We will analyse the language
providing connections with the Propositional Dynamic Logic proposed in [17] and exten-
sively used in Computer Science, extending it to treat Multi Agent Systems and Collective
Actions.
2 A cognitive model for shame and sense of guilt
In this section we are going to discuss the cognitive model developed by Castelfranchi,
Miceli and Poggi in [22,8,7], that takes into account the Multi Agent nature of emotions
such as shame and sense of guilt (described as social emotions), linking them to the notions
of agency and norm violation.
The belief of responsibility Miceli and Castelfranchi [22] emphasize how the perceived
causal responsibility [10] and [33], that is the belief of having had the capacity to avoid a
damage or a violation, is a crucial notion for distinguishing these feelings: “when ashamed,
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Fig. 1 Epistemic state of agents
feeling guilty
Fig. 2 Epistemic state of agents
feeling ashamed
one sees oneself as incompetent or inadequate with respect to some goal; when guilty, one
sees oneself as endowed with negative power.” ([22], p. 295).2
In a nutshell we can focus on the following statements:
– In case of sense of guilt, the agent (say Bill) believes that he could have avoided what he
did. Let us suppose that in this past moment he had an action kissmonica that lead to
a bad state, and an alternative action kissmonica that lead to a good state. And that he
chose the first.
In the Fig. 1 the P DL−,¬ formula3〈kissmonica〉−1〈kissmonica〉O K is true at q1, where
O K is the atom made true at the double-circled states. The whole sentence means: “If he
had not done kissmonica he could have done kissmonica and this would have avoided
a damage”.
– In case of shame, Bill believes he could not avoid the present bad situation. In the Fig. 2,
〈kissmonica〉−1〈kissmonica〉O K is false at q1. The whole sentence means “If he had
not done kissmonica he could not have done any other action to avoid the damage”. In
this case Bill is so much in love with Monica that he just cannot avoid kissing her.
It seems fundamental to represent actions, ability to refrain, and belief about the conse-
quences of them, with respect to a given set of deontic statements.
In a Multi Agent System we can moreover imagine situations in which a bad state is
avoided only by two agents working together. For instance Bill and Monica could avoid to
have a relation (see Fig. 3).
2 In Maria Miceli’s words shame is the perception of oneself being a dull knife, whereas feeling guilty is the
perception of oneself being a sharp knife (Maria Miceli “Personal Communication”).
3 We call P DL−,¬ the variant of Propositional Dynamic Logic [17] with converse operator and atomic action
negation.
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Fig. 3 Collective guilt
The Significant Others Following [31], we conceive of the notion of misbehaviour as having
a social connotation. According to this account, deontic judgments are socially determined.
Agents import such judgments from a particular subset of other agents, those ones on which
they are dependent, they care about, and whose standards they have the goal to meet: the
Significant Others. Significant Others are important for the decision of accepting or not
accepting a deontic judgment. When agents use values or norms as input for their decisions
to comply with what is prescribed, we say that these values or norms have been internalized.
An internalized norm, thus, drives the agents’ behaviour towards obedience. Psychological
research has shown that internalization can be induced, by Significant Others’ expectations
[31] and commands [15]. In this respect it is interesting to consider the reaction to the Lew-
inski case of the former German chancellor Helmut Kohl. In an interview with the German
newspaper Die Welt, the chancellor said it was not up to him to pass judgement on Mr. Clin-
ton’s private life. But he said the way people all over the world were following the most
private details on the Internet was enough to make him sick [5]. Kohl points out how “people
all over the world” were judging some facts that are usually “private details”. As we already
observed, in the Lewinski case Public Opinion was left to determine which behaviours were
acceptable and which were not (being faithful, say the truth, let other people believe in his
being faithful, etc.).
In this article the dynamics of internalization will be taken into account with respect to the
way changing Significant Others influences the set of world states agents label as good and
acceptable, and what the consequences of these are in terms of feeling guilty and ashamed.
For instance keeping American people ignorant or not concerned with his personal affairs
would have allowed President Clinton to avoid public exposure. But different agents may
have different strategies to cope with their emotions [31]. We may indeed observe, due to
difference in personality traits, a pride reaction in some agents, while instead others may
show feelings of loneliness and exclusion (Maria Miceli “Personal Communication”). We
can imagine high self esteem agents that tend to pride, while low self esteem that tend to
show loneliness. Personal feelings can also come up, like sense of guilt and shame towards
the self. The interplay is sketched in Table 1.
Table 1 Emotional reactions in a Multi Agent System









Negative power Sense of guilt
towards the self
Indifference Sense of guilt Pride/Loneliness
Inadequacy Shame towards the self Indifference Shame Pride/Loneliness
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We can notice that agents can have fail to accomplish values they personally have, this
is the reason why guilt and shame can be addressed towards the self. We believe that the
different opinions that an agent and its Significant Others have concerning a relevant value
can be associated with phenomena like cognitive dissonance and the processes that lead to
its resolution [15].
2.1 Controlling emotions
One of the most interesting features of the cognitive approach in [22,8,7] is that of human
beings having some control of their emotions. “In particular, people can react to their own
emotions defending themselves from the disturbing or blamed ones. They try to repress, deny,
and manipulate them.” [7].
We are going to develop this intuition by describing both control via belief manipulation
and control via goal manipulation. The first type of control will act on an agent belief base
in order to eliminate those beliefs that induce the emotion in the self, while the second will
act with the same purpose on the agent goal base. But how would these strategies work?
Elaborating on Miceli and Castelfranchi’s proposal in [22], the different types of reaction
can be related to basic psychological types of agents, such as high self esteem (HSE) and
low self esteem (LSE) ones. HSE people might try to question the basis on the grounds of
which they are blamed or they feel bad; they will react actively by trying to find justifica-
tions for their actions. Instead LSE agents will tend to apologise and find excuses, as they
are more unlikely to question the values which they are accused to go against. In this sense
HSE agents will tend to react with pride to the above mentioned situation, while LSE agents
will react with for instance feeling lonely or rejected. We distinguish a typical LSE reaction,
“I did not know”, that we classify as an excuse by claiming ignorance of the relevant effects
of a dangerous action that has been carried out, from a typical HSE reaction, “It was not that
bad”, that is a justification on a presumed violation. It claims that what others may think as
wrong is not really so.
Among the beliefs agents can control is indeed that of an agent being a Significant Other.
This last type of control is of fundamental importance, because it allows to modify the moral
valuations agents have about the world. What we mean here is the following: Significant Oth-
ers have the role to tell what it is important/good for an agent to do, and in this sense modifying
Significant Others means to automatically change evaluation of what is good or bad.
We argue that these mechanisms can be formally modeled.
3 Emotion dynamics in shame and sense of guilt
In this part we analyze shame and sense of guilt in terms of their preconditions and postcon-
ditions, that is what are the cognitive states that cause someone to feel ashamed or guilty and
what are the possible reactions that such emotions trigger.
3.1 Shame
Preconditions As argued in [7] feeling ashamed always involves a believed negative self
evaluation (concerning one’s inadequacy) related to somebody whose judgment agents care
about. In this sense a precondition for feeling ashamed is the belief of not having had a
capacity to get over a bad state.
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Reactions As far as the behaviour is concerned, the goal of an ashamed person is to reduce
exposure [8]. This will be translated into various actions, either minimizing the importance
of a value (agents that are proud of something), which is an HSE agent’s typical reaction, or
minimizing their active contribution to a damage by declaring submission and imperfection,
which are typical LSE agents’ reactions.4
Clinton’s reaction was clearly an LSE reaction: he firstly did not admit that what he did
was wrong (it was an extreme case of minimization of one’s active contribution to a dam-
age), and when he admitted it he never justified himself. One alternative answer could be
summarized by the exclamation “It’s not your business!”—a clear HSE reaction—holding
others not concerned with the wrongdoing.
3.2 Feeling guilty
Preconditions The feeling of guilt is usually linked to the conviction of having actively
injured someone or broken some moral imperative or norm [7]. It will be associated to the
evaluation of having negative power against a given situation, i.e. a perception of respon-
sibility. From agent types reactions and beliefs of responsibility, it is intuitively clear how
difficult it is to both feel ashamed and guilty at the same time for the very same thing. Either
agents believe to be a dull knife or a sharp knife, i.e. holding consistent beliefs either does an
agent believe he actively made a mistake (while being able to avoid it) or he beliefs he could
not have avoided it. Nevertheless the transitions between the two feelings can be carried out
by means of a belief revision [36] concerning responsibility.
Reactions Reactions in case of sense of guilt are similar to that of shame for HSE and LSE
agents. But there are some more we mention for the sake of completeness. As far as reactive
behaviour is concerned, one first goal of agents that feel guilty is that of reparation, which
triggers the agent to care about the damaged person, and to expiate, to pay in some sense for
what has been done. A very interesting property of agents that feel guilty is to regret doing
something, that act as a situation marker [11]. Regret can be exemplified by the sentences
“I wish I did not do it”. We can thus say that regret is the desire of not having done something
that was actually done. Reactions in the direction of cancelling the belief of ability or of
importance of the action made will be modeled.
4 A language for rational agents with emotions
4.1 Emotional Multi Agent KARO
The reconstruction of cognitive agents that feel guilty and ashamed needs some further
concepts with respect to those already in [19]. We need to reason about agents’ deontic judg-
ments, their mismatch with what they believe others have and operations that act directly
on the agent emotional state, i.e. allow changing perception of situations in order not to feel
bad. The work of Meyer in Dynamic Deontic Logic [18] and of Meyer and colleagues in the
logic of emotions [19] provide a solid basis for addressing this issue.
What we need to do more is to extend the formalism in order to capture the Multi Agent
aspects of actions and emotions, how for instance many agents can feel guilty for something
4 In [8] it is argued how emotional displays of shame are admissions of imperfection, for instance blushing.
Blushing is not a confession of guilt but it still has a precise communicative function. We can be caught doing
something that looks bad with respect to others (even though we know they are wrong) and yet blush.
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they independently or collectively caused. The analysis of collective responsibility in orga-
nizational and Multi Agent settings has been addressed for instance in [16,33] and logics
for Multi Agent interaction flourish [2,25]. To our knowledge no attempt has so far been
made to bridge the gap between Multi Agent interaction research and the formal treatment
of emotions.
Our plan is then to start with a Multi Agent extension of the KARO framework. We will
introduce in such a framework a set of violation constants Vi indexed with agents, that will
label worlds that are bad for particular agents, as well as different dynamics for different types
of agents. Even though we will in fact be able to talk about more agents in this framework,
collective actions will be only addressed in the last part.
4.2 The language
The actions that agents perform can have different forms. We classically consider a finite set
of atomic actions from which all the others can be obtained compositionally. We will not
consider parallel execution of action—that will be instead used in the last part to talk about
collective action—while action negation (i.e. refraining) will be limited to the atomic case.5
Finally the planning component in emotions requires the treatment of the notion of action
composition and iteration. The set of action expressions Act is the smallest set containing
all actions of the following form:
α ::= b|eliminate( j)|welcome( j)|α;α|α∗
where b = a|a is an atomic action or its negation; i, j ∈ Agt , which is the set of agents;
eliminate, welcome actions will be used for updating evaluations and will be dealt with as
special actions later on in the paper. The informal meaning of these actions is that an agent
changes its evaluation of the world states, by eliminating or adding Significant Others. The
operation of union, composition ; and iteration ∗ are standard regular operations [17]. The
set of events Evt6 has the following grammar:
ξ ::= i : α|ξ ∪ ξ |ξ ; ξ |ξ∗
The grammar of events language is computationally quite simple. We restrict ourselves to
such grammar for the sake of simplicity. More complex extensions are possible, for instance
talking about complex plans or group actions or even parallel group actions. We point out
that events are more than just actions. In classical dynamic logic there is no notion of agency
in a Multi Agent context. By introducing the notion of event, we will allow for agents being
associated to a certain action.7
To model transitions we will use the KARO metaphor of action as model update [37]. The
idea is that actions make us jump to new worlds in which the original relations are changed.
Say if, in a situation w where we do not know whether p, we learn that p holds, we end up
in a new model where the epistemic possibilities stemming from w will agree with p.
5 For the technical reasons see [18].
6 As it will be clear from the semantics, what we call here events is elsewhere understood as action. We prefer
to stick to the word event as done in Dynamic Epistemic Logic, Product Update [3] and Agent Based Logic
Programming [12]. The reader has to be aware that this is not the only possible interpretation of such concept.
7 In our framework a Single Agent System can be obtained just dropping the agent index i from the event
semantics, that becomes ξ ::= α|ξ ∪ ξ |ξ ; ξ |ξ∗. In a Single Agent System events are reducible to actions.
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On the Multi Agent structure of events We would like to work on models that allow for
events to be indeterministic in the future, while keeping a linear past. The reader can think
of a history as an intuitive model for the transitions we have in mind. In a history every node
has a unique predecessor (the course events took) while allowing for multiple successors (the
course events may take).
Formally we impose an order < that links pairs model-world with events.
<= {(〈M, w〉, 〈M ′, w′〉)|∃ξ ∈ Evt s.t. 〈M ′, w′〉 ∈ [[ξ ]]R 〈M, w〉}.
For all 〈M, w〉, there is a unique 〈M ′, w′〉 such that 〈M ′, w′〉 < 〈M, w〉. Moreover we
impose that this predecessor is reachable by a unique transition. 〈M ′, w′〉 ∈ [[ξ ]]R 〈M, w〉
implies that for all ξ ′ = ξ not 〈M ′, w′〉 ∈ [[ξ ′]]R 〈M, w〉.
This guarantees linear past and branching future and it has a syntactic counterpart that is
expressible in the logic of programs [17].
4.2.1 Syntax
We assume a finite set of agents Agt and a countable set of atomic propositions 0. Moreover
we introduce special atoms Vi for i ∈ Agt . Special atoms are extensively used to describe
also emotional states and agent types. Our language is given by the following syntax:
φ ::= p|L(i)|H(i)|guilt y(i, a, j)|ashamed(i, a, j)|Vi |¬φ|φ ∧ ψ |
Sigi, j |Biφ|Diφ|[ξ ]φ|[ξ ]−1φ
where p ∈ 0 (the set of atomic propositions) , i, j ∈ Agt, α ∈ Act, ξ ∈ Evt . L(i), H(i)
indicate a Low and High Self Esteem personality type of the agent, guilt y(i, a, j) and
ashamed(i, a, j) refers to an agent i feeling guilty or ashamed for an action a relative to
an other agent j . They will be later defined as abbreviations. The informal reading of the
modalities is “i is a Significant Other for j”, “i believes that φ is true”, “i desires that φ is
true” , “after ξ, φ becomes true”, “before ξ, φ was true”.
We moreover use the following abbreviations: φ∨ψ := ¬(¬φ∧¬ψ); φ → ψ := ¬φ∨ψ ;
φ ↔ ψ := (φ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → φ); 〈ξ〉φ := ¬[ξ ]¬φ, which are usual in modal logic.
In our logic we add the following abbreviations: Pφ =: 〈(∨i∈Agt
∨
a∈Act (i : a))〉−1φ (φ
was true just before the latest action), DONE j (b) := 〈( j : b)〉−1(p ∨ ¬p) (Agent j did b),
DONE j (b) := ∨c∈Act,c =b〈( j : c)〉−1(p ∨ ¬p) (Agent j did not do b).
4.2.2 Structure
The structures interpreting the language L are given by a class of E-KAROUS8 models in
which each model M is of the following shape:
M = 〈Agt, W, Act, σ, {Bi |i ∈ Agt}, {Di |i ∈ Agt}, Aut, 〉
In which Agt is a finite nonempty set of agents. We take Agt = Agth ∪ Agtl . We require
Agth ∩ Agtl = ∅: the set of agents is partitioned into Agth which will represent the HSE
agents and Agtl , the LSE agents. W is a nonempty set of worlds; Act is the finite set of basic
actions;
8 E-KAROUS is a fancy transformation of KARO to an emotional Multi Agent shape, resembling moreover
the name of a person that did not pay much attention to the suggestions of his friends.
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ashamed(i, a, j) → 2W
is the augmented valuation function, that assigns each atom to a set of worlds, with the
intended meaning that they are those worlds in which the atom is true. {Bi |i ∈ Agt} is an
epistemic accessibility relation; Each Bi ⊆ W × W is composed by pairs {w,w′} in such a
way that the world w′ represents an epistemic alternative for agent i at world w. We indicate
with [w]Bi the set of epistemic alternatives for agent i at world w. {Di |i ∈ Agt} is defined as
Bi for desired worlds. Aut is a function g such that g : Agt × Agt ×W → 2W . This function
associates to pair of agents and a situation a set of situations. {v} = Aut (i, j, w) can be then
read as “In world w, world v is the only world considered bad by agent i , because of agent
j”. We may have more agents that make someone dislike some situation. We say that those
agents block that situation. We label as Sig(i,w) = { j |∃w′s.t.w′ ∈ Aut (i, j, 〈w〉)} the set of
Significant Others for agent i at the situation 〈M, w〉. This set comprises those agents that
block at least one situation in a given situation for agent i .
4.2.3 Semantics
The formulas of our language L are interpreted as follows:
– M, w | p iff w ∈ σ(p); Propositional cases are treated as usual;
– M, w | L(i) iff i ∈ Agtl ;
– M, w | H(i) iff i ∈ Agth ;
– M, w | guilt y(i, a, j) iff w ∈ σ(guilt y(i, a, j))
– M, w | ashamed(i, a, j) iff w ∈ σ(ashamed(i, a, j))
– M, w | Vi iff w ∈ ⋃ j Aut (i, j, w);
– M, w | Biφ iff M, w′ | φ for all w′ s.t. wBiw′;
– M, w | Diφ iff M, w′ | φ for all w′ s.t. wDiw′;
– M, w | [ξ ]φ iff M ′, w′ | φ for all 〈M ′, w′〉 s.t. 〈M, w〉 [[ξ ]]R 〈M ′, w′〉;
– M, w | [ξ ]−1φ iff M ′, w′ | φ for all 〈M ′, w′〉 s.t. 〈M ′, w′〉 [[ξ ]]R 〈M, w〉;
– M, w | Sigi, j iff j ∈ Sig(i,w);
where [[]]R is a relation between models, that accounts for the change in the situations brought
about by actions. Its semantics and behaviour are analyzed in depth in the Appendix.
4.2.4 Constraints on the models
We denote with [[φ]]M the set A such that A = {w|M, w | φ}. We constrain our models in
the following way:
– For all w ∈ W, [w]Bi = ∅;







B j Sigi, j
]]
M ;







– [[Vi ]]M ⊆ [[Bi Vi ]]M ;
– W\ [[Vi ]]M ⊆ [[Bi¬Vi ]]M
Notice that the first two properties force the belief modality to be serial, transitive and
euclidean.
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4.2.5 Validities
We recall that M | φ indicates that M, w | φ, for any world w; and that M | φ if M | φ
for any M in the class of models M.
In the class of E-KAROUS models M this holds:
– M | Bi;
– M | ¬Biφ → Bi¬Biφ;
– M | Biφ → Bi Biφ;
– M | Sigi, j → Bi Sigi, j ;
– M | ¬Sigi, j → Bi¬Sigi, j ;
– M | Vi → Bi Vi ;
– M | ¬Vi → Bi¬Vi
– M | [i : a](DONEi (a) ∧ [i : b]¬DONEi (a))
– M | 〈i : a〉−1φ → ∧a =b[i : b]−1⊥
– M | ∨i∈Agt 〈i : a ∪ i : a〉−1φ →
∧
i∈Agt [i : a ∪ i : a]−1φ
The first three entries are standard for K D45 (or weak S5) models of beliefs [6], forbidding
logical inconsistency and allowing positive and negative introspection. The fourth and fifth
add positive and negative introspection for Significant Others. It makes sense to claim that if
an agent has some Significant Other x if and only if he also believes to have x as Significant
Other. The next one shows how action execution is witnessed by the modality DONE. The
last two validities correspond to linear past. We insert the proof of the last validity, the others
are standard or easy to work out.
Proof Assume M | ∨i∈Agt 〈i : a ∪ i : a〉−1φ. Take an arbitrary pair model-world
(M, w). This means that there is an agent j and a pair model-world M ′, w′ such that
(M, w) [[ j : a ∪ j : a]]−1 (M ′, w′). We know that there is unique (M ′′, w′′) s.t. (M ′′, w′′) <
(M, v). Recall that (M ′′, w′′) < (M, v) if there is an event ξ such that (M ′′, w′′) [[ξ ]] (M, v).
Take ξ to be j : b. We know that M ′, w′ | φ. Uniqueness means that for all other actions
c and agents k, (M, w) [[k : c]]−1 (M ′, w′). So this is enough to conclude M | ∧i∈Agt
[i : a ∪ i : a]−1φ.
4.3 Changing Significant Others
In [36] non standard actions such as those that induce mind changing are described. In the
same fashion we would like to describe those actions that update the authority relations
among agents. In particular agents should be able to resolve their cognitive dissonance by
eliminating Significant Others or welcoming new ones.
We describe the transition function [[]]R for actions welcome, eliminate, replace leav-
ing the treatment of the capability function c [35] that tells us when agents have the internal
ability to perform these actions, to future work. These are special actions that transform the
models in an intuitive way. The first updates the set of relevant others by adding a new agent.
Violation states are updated as specified. The second deletes an agent from such set. The
third operation first deletes some agents and after adds new ones to the set.
Definition 1 For some E-KAROUS model
M = 〈Agt, W, Act, σ, {Bi |i ∈ Agt}, {Di |i ∈ Agt}, Aut, Ag〉 with w ∈ W and p, q ∈
0 be given. We define:
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All 〈M ′, w′〉 ∈ [[i : welcome( j)]]R 〈M, w〉 are such that:
M ′ = 〈Agt, W, Act, σ ′, {Bi |i ∈ Agt}, {Di |i ∈ Agt}, Aut ′, Ag〉 with
– Aut ′(i ′, j ′, 〈M ′, w′〉) = Aut (i ′, j ′, 〈M, w〉) if i = i ′ or j = j ′ or w′ = w;
– Aut ′(i, j, 〈M ′, w′〉) = {w|M, w | Vj } ;
– σ ′(q) = σ(q) for q = Vj
After welcoming an agent the authority relation referred to him is updated with the reason
of such welcome, while the authority relation concerning the other agents does not change.
A corresponding change happens at the propositional level, in such a way that the violation
states of the welcomed agent become violation for the agent that performs the welcoming
action.
Definition 2 〈M ′, w′〉 ∈ [[i : eliminate( j)]]R 〈M, w〉 are such that:
M ′ = 〈Agt, W, Act, σ ′, {Bi |i ∈ Agt}, {Di |i ∈ Agt}, Aut ′, Ag〉 with
– Aut ′(i ′, j ′, 〈M ′, w′〉) = Aut (i ′, j ′, 〈M, w〉) if i = i ′ or j = j ′ or w′ = w;
– Aut ′(i, j, 〈M ′, w′〉) = ∅ ;
– σ ′(q) = σ(q) for q = Vj
Eliminating behaves dually. The agent that is eliminated does not represent an authority
anymore, and the change is mirrored at the propositional level. Notice that eliminating an
agent is not enough to turn a bad situation in a good one. There may be n−1 more eliminating
actions needed if we assume |Agt | = n.
Definition 3
[[
i : replace( j, k)]]R 〈M, w〉 = [[(i : eliminate( j); welcome(k)]]R 〈M, w〉
Replacing is a mere composition of eliminating and welcoming.
Proposition 1 For any M ∈ M, q ∈ 0, i = j, j = k, k = i :
– M | Sigi,k ↔ [i : welcome( j)]Sigi,k;
– M | [i : welcome( j)]Sigi, j ;
– M | [i : welcome( j)](Vj → Vi );
– M | q → [i : welcome( j)]q;
– M | Sigi,k ↔ [i : eliminate( j)]Sigi,k;
– M | [i : eliminate( j)]¬Sigi, j
– M | [i : eliminate( j)](Vj → Vi );
– M | q → [i : eliminate( j)]q;
– M | Sigi, j → [i : replace( j, k)]Sigi,k;
– M | [i : replace( j, k)]¬Sigi, j
– M | q → [i : replace( j, k)]q
The first four items deal with the welcoming operation. The first of them says that welcom-
ing a new agent does not affect the perception of others; the second simply that welcoming
causes an agent to be a Significant Other; the third that the reason of welcome is automat-
ically a violation for the agent; the fourth that the evaluation of the other propositions do
not change. The eliminating operations behaves dually, while replacing can be obtained by
composing the other two. These validities clearly correspond to the relational changes that
define these operations.
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5 The dynamics of guilt and shame
5.1 Sense of guilt
Preconditions An agent feels guilty when it observes that what he actively caused was vio-
lation for some of his Significant Others.
This means that the agent believes the actual world state he actively chose (that he could
avoid) satisfies a violation condition for some agent j which happens to be a Significant
Other.
For simplicity, we limit the treatment to atomic cases. It is nevertheless possible to address
complex actions. Taken a ∈ Act ,
Bi (Sigi, j ∧ Vj ∧ DONEi (a) ∧ P(〈i : a〉¬Vj )) → guilt y(i, a, j)
For instance if the President believes that the American people are a Significant Other and
that he did an action he should not have done and he believes that there was a good alternative
that he did not carry out, then he feels guilty.
Reactions In the KARO framework a classical deliberation cycle is assumed [19]. In our
case deliberation is a just a special action that updates beliefs, desires, commitments and
status of Significant Others by means of the above defined revision actions. For our purpose
it is sufficient to know that we can have an action with special effects, as for instance those
that welcomed or eliminated Significant Others. Reactions to sense of guilt are influenced
by the level of self esteem agents have. We can distinguish two categories, Agth , high self
esteem agents, which will react providing justifications to their actions and in extreme cases
changing the significance they attribute to people. On the other side, Agtl , low self esteem
people will try to find excuses for their actions and to generate reparation goals, that is to
perform an action in such a way to avoid further violations.
H(i) ∧ Bi (Vj ) ∧ guilt y(i, a, j) → [deliberatei ](〈i : eliminate( j)〉(p ∨ ¬p) ∨ Bi (¬Vj )
So either i will update authority relations by cancelling j , or he will believe the present state
is not violation for j .
On the other hand the following may be said for LSE agents.
L(i) ∧ Bi (Vj ) ∧ guilt y(i, a, j) → [deliberatei ]Bi (P[i : a]Vj ))
The low self esteem agent will find excuses for his wrongdoing, for instance he will
generate the belief that what it did was unavoidable.
5.2 Shame
Preconditions Shame is the believed lack of a relevant feature, that is the believed incapacity
to achieve a value that is important for the agent or for its Significant Others. If only the
first is present we will talk of shame towards the self. We are going to formalize shame by
considering an agent that believes it is possible to get over a violation state but that there is
no capability for him/her to do so.
Bi (Sigi, j ∧ Vj ∧ DONEi (a) ∧ P([i : a]Vj )) → shame(i, a, j)
So avoiding Vj is something which i is not able to comply. For instance if Bill believes
that the American people are a Significant Other and that he did an action he should not have
done and he believes that there was no good alternative, then Bill feels ashamed.
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Reactions What do ashamed agents do? We distinguish LSE reactions and HSE reactions.
Similarly with sense of guilt, the first types of reactions will tend to manipulate the belief
base in such a way to remove the belief of incapacity.
shame(i, a, j) ∧ i ∈ L(i) → [deliberatei ](Bi (¬[i : a]Vj )
The second type of reactions will try to update authority relations, so that they do not perceive
their incapacity as wrong. This is a typical pride reaction.
shame(i, a, j) ∧ i ∈ H(i) → [deliberatei ]〈i : eliminate( j)〉(p ∨ ¬p)
5.3 Further properties
Our language is powerful enough to distinguish shame and sense of guilt.
M | shame(i, a, j) ↔ guilt y(i, a, j)
We are also able to prove that the two feelings are locally incompatible, that is either an agent
believes to be a dull knife or a sharp knife.
M | ¬(shame(i, a, j) ∧ guilt y(i, a, j))
This is of course to be related with the property of consistent beliefs. If we allow for epistemic
accessibility relation to be locally empty, we may conceive situations M, w in which agents
believe to be guilty and ashamed.
M, w | Bi⊥ → shame(i, a, j) ∧ guilt y(i, a, j)
It has to be noticed that shame(i, b, j) ∧ guilt y(i, a, j) is a satisfiable formula, as well
as shame(i, a, k) ∧ guilt y(i, a, j), even when forcing beliefs to be consistent.
Example The properties of our logic seem to suggest that Bill could not feel both ashamed
and guilty for the very same thing. It is then puzzling to read that he felt responsible in its days
of shame. We think that indeed Bill must have felt guilty while admitting his responsibility.
There was something he could have done and it could have avoid the damage.
M, w | BBill(〈kissmonica〉−1〈kissmonica〉O K )
And he and presumably his wife considered what he did wrong.
M, w | VHilar y ∧ SigHilar y,Bill
Notice that all this amounts to saying
M, w | BBill(SigHilar y,Bill ∧ VHilar y ∧ DONEBill(kissmonica) ∧ P
×(〈Bill : kissmonica〉¬Vj ))
And by Propositional Reasoning:
M, w | guilt y(Bill, kissmonica, Hilary)
However, he explicitly declared both embarrassment and perception of responsibility. The
real case is of course more complex than the logical abstractions, nevertheless a model is
possible. In fact the problem of Bill was his being both a man (with his personal life and
affairs) and a President (with his public life and affairs).
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What happened at the presidential level can be described as follows:
M, w | BPresident (〈president : lie〉−1〈president : lie〉O K )
We can assume that moral integrity is a value for an American President:
M | [president : lie][president : a ∪ president : a]∗VAmericans
If he lies once he becomes and remains a bad President. We can imagine for instance that
he will lose his good reputation. Anyway it is an act he cannot repair: after the lie action there
is no action to go back.
This allows us to conclude:
M, w | guilt y(President, president : lie, Americans) ∧
[president : lie]ashamed(President, president : lie, Americans)
Of course a good strategy would have been not to lie. Moreover we suspect
M, w | guilt y(President, kissmonica, Americans) ∧
[kissmonica]ashamed(President, kissmonica, Americans)
to hold, as well. For the Public Opinion it is a good thing to have a President that also in his
private life does not cheat.
This in fact might have caused President Clinton to carry out the following LSE action:
[deliberatePresident ][president : a ∪ president : a]VAmericans
Instead of the HSE reaction:
[deliberatePresident ]¬VAmericans
On the one hand he felt ashamed towards the American People (that he was not able to elim-
inate as Significant Other), for a feature that he did not have (moral integrity as a President).
On the other he felt responsible towards his family for an action he deliberately committed.
5.4 Collective shame and sense of guilt
In many social interactions, as in the Lewinski case, responsibility for a damage is often
shared. So far we could not express the fact that two agent could only work together by
avoiding a damage. We can generalize the treatment of emotions by introducing a parallel
action in the language.
The semantics of collective action is treated in the appendix, the syntax of Evt is extended
in the following way:
ξ ::= i : α|ξ ∪ ξ |ξ ; ξ |ξ∗|ξ ∩ ξ
Moreover we introduce new atoms that talk about collective emotions.
For instance guilt y({i, j}, i : a ∩ j : b, k) means that the set of agents {i, j} feels col-
lectively guilty with respect to the event i : a ∩ j : b, towards the common Significant
Other k.9
9 Also here generalizations are possible, think of two agents that feel guilty with respect to two different
Significant Others for the very same fact.
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To interpret this atom we need to further extend the valuation function in the obvious way:
we skip the details for clarity.
In our models the following propositions hold:
M | guilt y({i, j}, i : a ∩ j : b, k) ↔ guilt y(i, a, k) ∧ guilt y( j, b, k)
It is satisfiable that a coalition is feels collectively guilty but its components do not.
M | ashamed({i, j}, i : a ∩ j : b, k) → ashamed(i, a, k) ∧ ashamed( j, b, k)
If a coalition is ashamed then its components are.
M | guilt y(i, a, k) ∧ guilt y( j, b, k) → guilt y({i, j}, i : a ∩ j : b, k)
If the components of a coalition feel guilty then also the coalition does.
M | (guilt y({i, j}, i : a ∩ j : b, k) ↔ guilt y(i, a, k) ∧ guilt y( j, b, k)) ⇔
M | ([i : a ∩ j : b]φ ↔ [i : a]φ ∧ [i : b]φ) is a validity .
In words, individuals are guilty as the coalition they form iff they cannot do more together
than what they already could do separately.
We include the proof of the last proposition, the others follow the same pattern:
Proof (⇐)
Assume that ([i : a∩ j : b]φ ↔ [i : a]φ∧[i : b]φ) is a validity . This means that taken an
arbitrary model M, M | [i : a∩ j : b]φ ↔ [i : a]φ∧[i : b]φ. This in turn means that for any
world w the set of successors v via the [i : a∩ j : b] action is equivalent to the set of successors
v′ via the independent actions [i : a] and [i : b]. Suppose now M, w | (guilt y({i, j}, i :
a ∩ j : b, k). This means that there is an action in i : a ∩ j : b that has ¬Vk as a consequence.
By the assumed equivalence this means that [i : a]¬Vk ∧ [ j : b]¬Vk . We are allowed to
conclude that M, w | guilt y(i, a, k) ∧ guilt y( j, b, k)). (guilt y({i, j}, i : a ∩ j : b, k)
follows by the previous proposition.
(⇒)
Assume that M | (guilt y({i, j}, i : a ∩ j : b, k) ↔ guilt y(i, a, k) ∧ guilt y( j, b, k)).
So the worlds for which i, j feel guilty together is the same of those for which they feel
guilty independently. This is a validity in an arbitrary model, so it is independent of the
atomic valuations. So the truth of the formulas are only dependent on the transitions. This
is enough to conclude that also the worlds they can reach together and those they can reach
independently constitute the same set.
6 Conclusion and future work
In this paper we provided a formal language to describe sense of guilt and shame as social
emotions. In order to do this we grounded our work on the cognitive theory of Castelfranchi
and Miceli, the psychological theory of Significant Others by Higgins, the rational action
theory in the KARO framework by Meyer and colleagues. The cognitive science perspective
has allowed us to build an anatomy of these emotions in terms of basic cognitive ingredients
such as Beliefs, Goals and Values. We described formally the operations that allow agents to
change their evaluations together with the people they take as references, and we connected
these to shame, sense of guilt and their dynamics in a Multi Agent System where agents can
coordinate and act together.
123
Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst (2010) 20:401–420 417
Much work still needs to be done. Apart from what was already pointed out throughout
the paper, we would like to: investigate further the theory of cognitive dissonance and to
give a formal characterization of the role of emotions in its resolution; to shed more light on
the characterization of emotions by studying the logical models that we used to talk about
them: could we rewrite the conditions that trigger these emotions without recurring to past
reasoning, but only as in [19] reasoning about the resulting conditions after an action execu-
tion? We would like to understand the connection of feeling ashamed and guilty with other
feelings like happiness and sadness already formally described in [19] and the agent types
defensive and offensive strategies in [22] and [20]. Finally, the Multi Agent view on emo-
tional agents can be profitably connected to already existing game-theoretical frameworks
(such as [4]) and in general to Normative Multi Agent Systems [1], that study how norms
are enforced and selected in agent societies.
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Appendix: Multi Agent action semantics
As in [18] we use synchronicity sets to model concurrency. There synchronicity sets repre-
sent those atomic actions that are executed in parallel by the agent. We borrow this idea to
model concurrency in a Multi Agent System, arguing in a game-theoretic fashion that the
interaction results from a parallel execution of strategies done by agents.
Notice that we do not consider groups of agents (or coalitions), as done for instance in
Cooperative Game Theory [25]. Further extensions in this direction will be considered.
In extending synchronicity sets for a MAS we label them with the corresponding set of
actors, henceforth “labeled synchronicity sets”.
Definition 4 A labeled synchronicity set is a sequence s = 〈a1, . . . , an〉 that associates to
each agent i(1 ≤ i ≤ n) an action from the action set Act











where n = |Agt |.
We may abbreviate the sequence into [ →i : a], for i agent and a action. We denote labeled
synchronicity sets with s, s1, s2, . . .. We denote the action of an agent i in a labeled synchro-
nicity set s with si = a in case i : a is the i-th element of s.
The set of labeled synchronicity sets is S = {[ →i : a]|a ∈ Act and i ∈ Agt}. S is finite,
provided Agt and Act are.
Sets can be composed, giving rise to traces: T R = {〈s1, . . . , sn, . . .〉|si ∈ S}. Intuitively
traces represent the evolution of the System given a sequence of Multi Agent actions. Traces
can be either finite or infinite.
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Definition 5 As a semantic counterpart of ; we take the operation ◦ that composes traces:
t1 = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 ◦ t2 = 〈s′m . . . s′m+k〉 becomes 〈s1, . . . , sn, s′m, . . . , s′m+k〉.
Intuitively, if we do not allow for indeterministic actions, a sequence of synchronicity sets
gives rise to a unique trace. Nevertheless we may not know the whole synchronicity set. If
we want to speculate on the possible consequences of sequences of actions of an agent or of
a subset of agents we need to take into account the possible answers of the opponents, that
is why it is useful to consider sets of traces. This is also true if we simply have a finite trace
at our disposal: the future is open.
We denote with T R, T R1, T R2 sets of traces. They can be composed as follows:
T R1 ◦ T R2 = {tr1 ◦ tr2|tr1 ∈ T R1 and tr2 ∈ T R2}.
If tr1 is infinite tr1 ◦ tr2 = tr1, for tr1, tr2 ∈ T R.
In order to relate traces originated by action execution to transitions we will contruct as
in [18] a semantic function [[]] : Agt → Act → 2T R. To ease notation we will say that the
event x : f (i.e. the action f made by x) gets associated to a set of traces K by the function
[[]], formally K = [[x : f ]].
Definition 6 For N the natural numbers, the behaviour of [[]] is described as follows:
– [[i : a]] = {s ∈ S|si = a};
– [[i : a]] = {s ∈ S|si = a};
– [[i : α;β]] = [[i : α]] ◦ [[i : β]] ;
–
[[
i : α∗]] = ⋃n∈N
[[
i : αn]];
– [[ξ ; θ ]] = [[ξ ]] ◦ [[θ ]];








What is left to do now is to associate action traces with a transition system, that is use the
full power of the action expression in the Kripke Models.
Definition 7 Taken ρ : S → M × W → 2M×W , where M is a set of models and W
of possible worlds,10 the behaviour of the function R : 2T R → M × W → 2M×W , for
tr1, tr2 ∈ T R is described as follows:
– R(s)〈M, w〉 = ρ(s)〈M, w〉;
– R(tr1 ◦ tr2)〈M, w〉 = R(tr2)(R(tr1)〈M, w〉).
R(T R)〈M, w〉 = {〈M ′, w′〉|〈M ′, w′〉 ∈ R(tr1)〈M, w〉 for tr1 ∈ T R}.
We redefine the function [[]]R as the composition of the function [[]] with the function R.
Definition 8
[[ξ ]]R 〈M, w〉 = R([[ξ ]])〈M, w〉.
As is clear from the definition we allow for indeterministic actions, that is actions of which
terminating executions are not necessarily ending up in a unique state [17].
For convenience, we sometimes view [[]]R as a functional relation, and we write 〈M, w〉
[[ξ ]]R 〈M ′, w′〉 to mean that from the situation 〈M, w〉 there is a terminating execution of
event ξ that changes the world state into the situation 〈M ′, w′〉.
10 In [18] the performance of actions in a world leads to a collection of worlds, while in [19] it leads to a pair
model-world. In this paper we keep both indeterminism of action and model update, just for completeness of
representation.
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